

Will the Trojan War take place? Violations of the rules of war and the Battle of the Dardanelles (1915)

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Abstract

The Battle of the Dardanelles is one of the key episodes of World War I on the Ottoman front between the British, the French, the Australians and New Zealanders on the one side, and the Ottoman army under German command on the other. Immediately after the Great War, the former belligerents engaged in another war, which protracts up until the present day: allegations of violations of the rules of war are mutually addressed, in order to become a salient element of political propaganda. Through the analysis of the major controversial issues (use of dum-dum bullets and asphyxiating gases, attacks on non-military objects and sites, treatment of prisoners of war) and the study of various sources (official documents, correspondence and reports issued by belligerent forces, memoirs of Dardanelles' veterans, ICRC reports) this article scrutinizes two crucial questions. Were the rules of war taken seriously on the battlefield? Was the law instrumentalized by the belligerents?

Keywords: Battle of Dardanelles, World War I, international humanitarian law, International Committee of the Red Cross, propaganda, respect for international humanitarian law, asphyxiating gases, dum-dum bullets, indiscriminate attacks, prisoners of war, Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.



Introduction

The Battle of the Dardanelles is one of the key episodes of World War I (WWI) on the Ottoman front between the Franco-British allies and their colonial troops on the one side, and the Ottoman army under German (and to a lesser extent Austrian) command on the other. It can be divided into two stages.¹ From 19 February to 18 March 1915 the allied fleet attempted in vain to penetrate the Dardanelles Straits. That failure led to an allied landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915, which triggered a land battle that lasted until 9 January 1916. Having tried in vain to move through the peninsula, the Allies left the region as they had arrived, by sea.

Whereas the Battle of the Dardanelles is a relatively neglected event in the collective British and – especially – French memory of the Great War, it occupies, on the other hand, a central place in the Turkish national memory and in that of the former British Crown Dominions, Australia and New Zealand. That place is attested today by the scale of the increasingly elaborate battle commemorations that have been organized in Turkey in recent years. For the aforementioned countries, the battle was, and therefore remains, a key episode in the account of how the nation State was formed. That account draws attention to the violence of the fighting but also, by contrast, to the loyalty of the enemy – if not the chivalry – demonstrated by the nation’s own combatants and, to an extent, by the enemy or by some enemies, Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (the ANZACs). Indeed, Turkish rhetoric focuses on an aspect that is presented as unifying: the “Turks”² and the ANZACs were both victims of Western imperialism, as were the Franco-British colonial African or Indian troops, who were hoodwinked by their leaders and their senior officers. In the southern hemisphere people have come to terms with the idea of a brutal but civilized “gentlemen’s war”.

In April 2002, an Australian national presented the police with a human skull from his home, saying that it had belonged to a “Turkish” soldier who had fought in the Dardanelles. The skull was finally handed over to the Turkish authorities and buried on 18 March 2003 in a small monument to the unknown soldier that was set up for that purpose in the commemorative area on the Gallipoli Peninsula.³ While the handing over of the skull illustrates the converging manner in which Turkey and Australia commemorate the battle, that atmosphere is not to everyone’s taste. On Turkish discussion forums, some wonder what could have prompted an ANZAC soldier to take home a “trophy” like that and prefer instead to underscore the “savagery” of the former enemies. On Australian forums, it is the bad treatment experienced by ANZAC prisoners

1 See for instance Peter Hart, *Gallipoli*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.

2 Contemporary Western sources often present the Ottoman army as the “Turkish army” and Ottoman combatants, in particular, are referred to as “Turks”.

3 Alexandre Toumarkine, “L’invention permanente des soldats inconnus en Turquie”, in François Cochet and Jean-Noël Grandhomme (eds), *Les soldats inconnus de la grande guerre: La mort, le deuil, la mémoire*, SOTECA 14–18 eds, Saint-Cloud, 2012, pp. 191–206.

that tarnishes that unity. Alongside those discussions, mention should be made of the growing number of historiographical studies in Turkey in the 2000s and 2010s that have been based, in particular, on documents from the Ottoman archives and the Ottoman press. Those publications often highlight the war crimes committed by the Franco-British enemy and, conversely, maintain that the Ottomans complied with international law. The conduct of the armies can be roughly assessed under four headings: the projectiles used and, in particular, the use of expanding “dum-dum” bullets; gas warfare; attacks on non-military objects and sites, especially on medical facilities; and, lastly but most important of all because it is a controversial matter, the treatment of prisoners of war. Those categories reflect the essential criteria that, during and immediately after the Great War, fed the reciprocal accusations of violating international law and broadly match those put forward on other fronts. Those were also the humanitarian issues that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had looked at and they were based on positive international law as it was at the time.

In this article, we will look at each of them in turn, after investigating the anti-“Turkish” prejudices that helped to paint a largely fantasy picture of the enemy at the start of the Dardanelles campaign. Mutual allegations of the use of dum-dum bullets and asphyxiating gases will be addressed as major controversial issues. If the attacks on non-military objects and sites during the campaign seems to be an indisputable fact, their extent and scope are, nonetheless, debatable. Last but not least, the respect of the rules of war concerned with the standards of treatment beyond the battlefield, namely in the camps for the prisoners of the adversary (the allied forces’ prisoners were detained in camps located in Ottoman territory, while those designated for Ottoman prisoners were placed in various territories under Allied rule), remains questionable. This article is primarily based on official documents, correspondence and reports issued by belligerent forces, as well as on the memoirs of Dardanelles’ veterans of various nationalities, which naturally reflect a prejudiced understanding of the facts. ICRC reports have also been consulted. The overall study of the violations of the rules of war relating to the Battle of the Dardanelles raises two questions: firstly, whether the law of war was instrumentalized by the belligerents; and secondly, whether the rules were taken seriously.

Initial anti-“Turkish” prejudices and their disappearance during the fighting

Allied soldiers arrived at the Dardanelles with their baggage of anti-“Turkish” prejudices, nurtured by the propaganda of their respective armies, which must have found a fertile orientalist ground, according to the *esprit du temps*. The combat was expected, therefore, to be a clash between the civilized and uncivilized worlds. The conception of the enemy as an inhuman, pitiless monster vanished during the fighting, where the enemy – now finally visible – appeared as

a human being like any other, and at the truce negotiations, which allowed a certain kind of friendly dialogue between the enemy forces.

In a work that was published in 1956 and swiftly became a classic on the battle of the Dardanelles, the Australian war correspondent Alan McCrae Moorehead⁴ gave a summary of how the “Turks” were perceived by their enemies before the land battle began and at its very beginning:

... there was at this early stage another and perhaps deeper feeling that there was a monstrosity and inhumanity about the Turks: They were cruel and sinister fanatics, capable of any sort of vice and bestiality – in brief, it was the popular picture that had been drawn of them by Byron and the emotions of Gladstonian liberal England. The Turks were “natives” – but natives of a peculiarly dangerous and subtle kind. And so the Australian and New Zealand soldiers fought, not an ordinary man, but a monster prefigured by imagination and by propaganda; and they hated him.⁵

He goes on to emphasize, as we have seen in the passage quoted above, the fact that this stereotype had been patiently constructed in Western public opinion with regard to the Eastern Question and the idea of the need to protect non-Muslim minorities against “Turkish” barbarity. One might wonder to what extent this stereotype was shared not only by the communities made up of inhabitants of former Western colonies but also by all the troops of the British and French Empires.

In the case of the French, the image of the Ottoman enemy was always tied to the idea of the Germans that had been inherited from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Evidence of that confusion is found in the use of the expression “*Turco-boches*” (“Turko-Krauts”) in the memoirs and the correspondence of men who had fought in the Dardanelles, for whom – out of ignorance – the Ottoman Empire did not conjure up any particular images. The French military command does not appear to have made any particular attempt to stir up hatred of the “Turks”. In his war memoirs entitled *Combats d’Orient. Dardanelles-Salonique (1915–1916)*, Captain Canudo points out that in the early months of the conflict, this was still the case and that it was well received, recalling: “General Gouraud⁶ told his troops not to place the “Turks” in the sphere of racial resentment and pitiless hatred that was to be reserved for the Germans.”⁷

Canudo goes one step further in suggesting that the attitude of the Turkish soldiers in the first hostilities helped to change the French perception for the better.

4 Author’s note: Alan M. Moorhead (1910–1983) was a correspondent during the Second World War and not the First.

5 Alan Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, Wordsworth Editions, London, 1997, p. 148 (first published in 1956).

6 As Gouraud had been seriously wounded and repatriated to France in June 1915, this speech was made between the landing at the end of April and late June 1915.

7 Captain Canudo, *Combats d’Orient. Dardanelles-Salonique (1915–1916)*, Hachette, Paris, 1917, p. 51. Ricciotto Canudo (1877–1923) was an Italian writer who had settled in Paris in 1902 and enlisted in the Foreign Legion at the start of the Great War.

“Besides, there is a degree of nobility in the Turks’ way of making war. ... It combines serenity and bravery.”⁸

With regard to the ANZACs, the British historian Robert Rhodes James observes that the initial, very caricatural perception was not immediately toned down, but rather reinforced. Physical mutilations caused by the violence of the hostilities, coupled with the unprecedented, terrifying impact of the weapons used, went a long way towards reinforcing the stereotyped brutality of the “Turks”.⁹

Moorehead considers that the shock over the brutality and inhumanity of the “Turks” ceased in May 1915, when the first huge scale attacks and counter-attacks took place but were unsuccessful, even giving way to incidents of fraternization across enemy lines, which were reminiscent of those that had taken place on the Western front in the winter of 1915 and put the military command in an awkward position:

Much the most important result of the battle and the truce, however, was that from this time onwards all real rancour against the Turks died out in the ANZAC ranks. They now knew the enemy from their own experience, and the Turk had ceased to be a propaganda figure. He was no longer a coward, a fanatic or a monster. He was a normal man.¹⁰

The Ottoman subject Münim Mustafa¹¹ also refers in his memoirs to the quickly dashed hopes engendered by gestures of friendship:

When the English bombardiers planned to throw bombs into our trenches, they sometimes threw tins of jam and sardines to surprise our guards, who retaliated by throwing packets of cigarettes. How wonderful it was if it carried on like that! But when bombs were later exchanged instead of gifts of things to eat and smoke, the din put an end to the good humour.¹²

The feeling of camaraderie among combatants that is emphasized in a number of sources carries little weight in the face of the reciprocal denunciations of violations of international law, which come as much from combatants’ recollections as from the military institutions.

The use of dum-dum bullets: Between misperceptions and propaganda arguments

Expanding bullets (dum-dum bullets), which were invented by the British and used in the Indian Empire as well as more generally in the colonies, were included in the categories of explosive missiles prohibited by the Hague

8 Canudo, above note 7, pp. 46–47.

9 Robert Rhodes James, *Gallipoli*, Pimlico, London, 1999, pp. 176–177. (First published in 1965.)

10 A. Moorehead, above note 5, pp. 158–159.

11 Münim Mustafa was studying law when war broke out. He was enlisted as a reserve officer. His memoirs were published for the first time in 1935, when they were serialized in the Turkish magazine *Hayat*.

12 Münim Mustafa, *Cepheden Cepheye*, Vol. I, Ege Basım Evi, Istanbul, 1940, p. 65.

Convention of 1899.¹³ The warring parties accused each other of nonetheless having made use of them since the start of the war. In the Dardanelles,¹⁴ those accusations were made right at the beginning of May 1915 by the Intelligence Office (*İstihbarat dairesi*) in the Ottoman command, an entity which was in charge of both intelligence and propaganda: photographs of bullets taken from the body of a wounded Ottoman national who had been admitted to hospital in Thrace were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then, in early June, medical reports of soldiers treated in a hospice in Istanbul were made public through the *Waqfs* department and the Sheikh ul-Islam. On 14 August 1915 the aforementioned Intelligence Office denounced the now intensive use of those bullets.¹⁵ Subsequently, in September 1915, the War Minister Generalissimo Enver Pasha appealed at least twice to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs for dum-dum bullets and then, as proof of the allegations, photographs of dum-dum bullets to be sent to the embassies of neutral countries, and particularly to the United States embassy.¹⁶

Those chronological markers clearly show how, like the other powers, the Ottoman command took diplomatic advantage of the issue of using bullets prohibited by the 1899 Convention and capitalized on the international public opinion that presumably “civilized” armies did not refrain from using uncivilized methods of warfare.

What about the soldiers themselves? Several British or ANZAC sources suggested that, rather, it was “Turkish” snipers who were equipped with explosive bullets.¹⁷ Münim Mustafa, a “Turkish” veteran of the battle, refers in his memoirs to another means of recognizing the bullets: the noise. Trusting the more experienced fighters, new arrivals concluded that bullets which made a noise similar to firecrackers were dum-dum bullets,¹⁸ that description is also found in accounts by Australian soldiers.¹⁹

13 To be more precise, by the Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, 29 July 1899 (entered into force 4 September 1900).

14 For the Ottoman archives on which the examples given in this paragraph are based, see Muzaffer Albayrak (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Çanakkale Muharebeleri*, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara, Vol. I, p. 98 and pp. 136–141 and Vol. II, p. 11, pp. 218–221 and p. 225.

15 A war diary of the first battalion of the Herefordshire Regiment, for example, has the following entry for 16 November 1915: “Sniper using ‘exploding’ bullets. These explode on impact, 1 man having his head shattered.” See Ray Westlake, *British Regiments at Gallipoli*, Pen & Sword Books, Barnsley, 1996, p. 245. Cecil Harold Duncan, New Zealand lance corporal in the Otago Battalion, wrote in a letter: “one [sniper] was shot with his own bullets”. See Glyn Harper and Major General Rhys Jones, *Letters from Gallipoli: New Zealand Soldiers Write Home*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2011, pp. 129–130.

16 Evidence has been found that the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs approached the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representing a neutral country, on such matters in December 1915.

17 See R. Westlake above note 15; G. Harper and R. Jones, above note 15.

18 M. Mustafa, above note 12, p. 49.

19 Lieutenant William Britt noted: “They [the Turks] were using dum-dums and explosive bullets, which crack over your head like a cracker.” See “Lt Britt Describes the First Day on Gallipoli”, *Australians at War*, available at: http://www.australiansatwar.gov.au/stories/stories_ID=100_war=W1_next=yes.html. On the role of aural recognition, see also the account by the Australian lieutenant H. D. Skinner (D.C. M.): “There was bang under my very heels – an explosive bullet, I suppose.” “Extracts from the letters of Lieut. H.D. Skinner, D.C.M.”, *Victoria University College Review*, 1917, available at: http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-VUW1917_31Spik-t1-body-d10.html.

In *Témoins: essai d'analyse et de critique des souvenirs de combattants édités en français de 1915 à 1928* (1929), the historian Jean Norton Cru emphasized the need to treat with caution reports by combatants on the Western front (France) of the enemy's use of dum-dum bullets or explosives, as the shockwave created by the impact of the bullets had misled the soldiers. The very impressive damage caused by the weapons used during the war also helped to bolster the idea of their use – most of all in the Dardanelles, where the enemy trenches or lines were extremely close.

This brief examination of the accusations and counter-accusations of the use of expanding bullets highlights several aspects: the symmetrical instrumentalization of the issue by the warring parties, based on perfect knowledge of international law and the testimony of neutral actors; the symmetrical nature of the accusations, as well as of the perceptions on which they were based; and lastly, the difficulty of finding support for those perceptions. This shows how necessary it is to put the accusations back in the timeline of the conflict and to locate them with the greatest possible accuracy in the course taken by the battle.

Non-recourse to asphyxiating gases: mutual dissuasion?

The Hague Declaration prohibited the use of lethal chemical substances for military purposes.²⁰ During the Great War, each side accused the other of violating the prohibitions envisaged in this instrument. While on the Western front the French had made limited use of asphyxiating grenades and cartridges in February 1915, recourse to gas warfare by the Germans at Ypres on 22 April 1915 unleashed veritable panic among the French troops.²¹ The British then used asphyxiating gases at Loos on 28 September 1915, followed shortly afterwards by the French.²² When the Ottoman embassy in Athens sent a coded telegram to warn its ministry that the Allies were about to use asphyxiating gases in the Dardanelles,²³ those gases had therefore not yet been used by the Franco-British on the Western front. During the winter of 1914–1915, i.e. before the Gallipoli landing in late April 1915, their use was nevertheless considered; but Churchill and Kitchener objected for fear of possible reprisals.²⁴ Only three days after that landing, asphyxiating gases were used for the first time by the Germans on the Western front.²⁵ The British were extremely worried: what if the Germans were sending

20 See the Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, 29 July 1899, (entered into force 4 September 1900), Preamble. “The contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases”.

21 Charles Ridet, “Gaz de combats”, in Jean-Yves Le Naour (ed.), *Dictionnaire de la Grande Guerre*, Larousse, Paris, 2014, pp. 242–245.

22 *Ibid.*

23 For the correspondence sent from Athens, see Ahmet Tetik and Mehmet Şükrü Güzel, *Osmanlılara Karşı İşlenen Savaş Suçları (1911–1921)*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2013, pp. 144–145.

24 Yigal Sheffy, “The Chemical Dimension of the Gallipoli Campaign: Introducing Chemical Warfare to the Middle East”, *War in History*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2005, p. 284.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 281.

asphyxiating gases to the Ottomans? A warning about the imminent arrival and hence about the possible use of asphyxiating gases was sent by the British general, Maxwell from Egypt in early May 2015.²⁶ Defensive equipment – very rudimentary gas masks – was then sent to the British troops that had landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula.²⁷ However, offensive gas bombs were not sent to them. Winston Churchill, the Lord of the Admiralty, was in favour of doing so; but General Hamilton and Admiral Robeck, head of the British Expeditionary Corps and head of the British naval forces, respectively, were opposed, as were most of the members of the War Council, and they maintained that position until the end of May 1915. The dispatch of offensive gases (in the form of grenades) was nonetheless requested in case reprisals needed to be carried out following the anticipated use of gases by the “Turco-German” forces.²⁸

On 2 July 1915 the Ottoman high military command asked its Ministry of War to communicate its objection to the enemy’s use of gas to the embassies of the neutral countries, and in particular to the United States, at this time a neutral country, and threatened the Allies with reprisals.²⁹ Notably, *The Laws of War on Land* (1880), a manual drafted by a member of the ICRC, Gustave Moynier, provided that “if the injured party deem the misdeed so serious in character as to make it necessary to recall the enemy to a respect for law, no other recourse than a resort to reprisals remains.”³⁰ On 4 July 1915 the Ottoman Intelligence Office reported the use of shrapnel that emitted a green-coloured gas,³¹ which was generally considered as indicating the use of chlorine (also known as bertholite), an asphyxiating gas. The British Ministry of War chose the press of a neutral country, the Netherlands,³² as the place to deny the Ottoman accusations conveyed by military communiqués that were published in the Ottoman press on 27 July 1915.³³ Those accusations were repeated by the Intelligence Office in September 1915.³⁴ However, asphyxiating gases were not sent to the British Expeditionary Corps. According to Yigal Sheffy, there were two reasons for that decision: the first has to do with the priority given to the Western front; the second relates to a mixture of a desire not to violate international law, ethical reasons and, quite simply, a desire to avoid being stigmatized by international public opinion.

The alleged use of asphyxiating gas by the “Turks” was denounced by the French Expeditionary Corps in the Dardanelles, which announced on 26 and 27

26 *Ibid.*

27 *Ibid.*, p. 283.

28 *Ibid.*, pp. 282–283.

29 For the letter of 2 July 1915, see M. Albayrak, Vol. II, above note 14, p. 225.

30 Quoted in François Cochet, “Haye (La), droit et conventions de”, in François Cochet and Rémy Porte (eds), *Dictionnaire de la grande guerre, 1914–1918*, Robert Laffont, Paris, p. 532.

31 M. Albayrak, Vol. I, above note 14, p. 147.

32 The newspaper *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, according to M. Albayrak, Vol. I, above note 14, p. 192.

33 Official statement from military headquarters, published in *İkdam*, 27 July 1915, No. 6624, in Murat Çulcu, *İkdam Gazetesi’nde Çanakkale Cephesi*, 3 November 1914–3 February 1916, Vol. 2, Denizler Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p. 517.

34 M. Albayrak, Vol. II, above note 14, pp. 30 and 85.

November 2015: “To our left, the Turks used asphyxiating gas for the first time.”³⁵ With regard to non-use by the Ottomans and two motives – apart from ethical reasons and respect for the rules of war – posited by Turkish historians on the basis of the Ottoman archives, two arguments were put forward by Anglo-Saxon historians in the late 1980s. For William Moore, if toxic gases had been dispatched to the Ottomans, they would have been used on the peninsula.³⁶ For Fritz Haber, the non-use of such gases by the parties to the conflict is explained by the poor atmospheric conditions and the Allied evacuation,³⁷ which seems plausible. Great Britain did use asphyxiating gases offensively on the Balkan and Palestinian fronts on dates subsequent to the Battle of the Dardanelles.³⁸

As in the case of dum-dum bullets, the case of toxic gases highlights the need to place the allegations of their use in a chronological framework that is as accurate as possible and to make comparisons with other fronts; reciprocity is then also seen to be at work, but this time supplemented by a new element, the role of expectations about the enemy’s possible or probable use of the weapon whose deployment had previously been rejected because of the various costs that its use would entail.

Attacks on non-military objects and sites: An indisputable fact

In sources that refer to the Battle of the Dardanelles, the Franco-British and ANZAC forces reported enemy artillery fire which damaged field hospitals that had been set up on the peninsula. The notoriety of the German artillerymen in the Ottoman battery system explains why it was more systematically attributed to the Germans than to the Ottomans. That was in keeping with the widespread belief within the Expeditionary Corps that the real enemy – and the savagery – was German³⁹; the brutality of the Ottomans was thought to follow the German example rather than being styled as supposed eastern savagery.

Strikes against medical facilities are also mentioned in the Ottoman archives or in the memoirs published by Germans and Turks. The incidents of aerial bombardment testify to the allied air force’s command of the skies. The bombing from British battleships or submarines shows that although the Ottoman naval victory on 18 March 1915 prevented the Allies from crossing the Dardanelles Straits, it did not annihilate the ability of the Expeditionary Corps’ naval fleet to inflict harm. Recent Turkish historiography on the violations of the

35 “Communiqués relatifs aux opérations militaires” published in the *Journal Officiel*, 29 November 1915, p. 8687, referred to in the *Journal de droit international*, Vol. 43, 1916, p. 267.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 280, n. 5. Sheffy refers to William Moore, *Gas Attack: Chemical Warfare 1915–18 and Afterwards*, Leo Cooper, London, 1987, p. 88.

37 W. Moore, above note 36, p. 280, which is based on Fritz Haber, *Poisonous Cloud. Chemical Warfare in the First World War*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 18.

38 Y. Sheffy, above note 24, p. 279.

39 See above note 9.

rules of war draws, in particular, on documents from the Ottoman archives to support the thesis that the allied armed forces systematically, and hence intentionally, bombed infirmaries and hospitals although they were appropriately marked.

In some cases, it was difficult to distinguish medical facilities, particularly when they were housed in *tekke*, Sufi brotherhood convents. That was the case of the hospital in the town of Lapseki, which was bombed in early June 1915, but especially of the hospital in the port of Akbas on the peninsula between Gallipoli and Eceabat (called Maydos at the time), opposite the Anatolian coast.⁴⁰

Notably, some of these facilities were used for multiple purposes or might have been placed in the vicinity of legitimate military objectives, and thus the attack on them might not have been unlawful *per se*. For example, an important arms store, medical centre and a hospital complex, the port of Akbas was the target of several bombings during the Dardanelles campaign.⁴¹ Akbas was used to transport troops and materials as well as to transfer wounded soldiers away from the front. On 25 April 1915, the very day of the allied landing on the peninsula, the E-11, a British submarine which had its sights trained on logistics transfers, sank the steamship *Halep* with dozens of wounded on board, drowning them all along with the crew.

There is only one proven instance of a religious building being struck by an attack: the mausoleum (*türbe*) of Şehzade Suleyman Pasha,⁴² which was some way from the combat zones, overlooking the Gulf of Saros. The mausoleum was damaged on 29 March 1915 by bombing from the *Agamemnon*, a British battleship. On 20 April 1915 the deputy of the German General Liman von Sanders, the commander of the Ottoman army, Friedrich (Fritz) Bronsart von Schellendorf, sent a strongly worded telegram of protest to the Foreign Office through the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointing out that in 1912 during the Balkan wars, the Serbs had protected the mausoleum of Sultan Murad I despite the fact that their ancestors had been defeated by the Ottomans in 1389 in the Battle of Kosovo Polje.⁴³

Aerial and naval bombings also targeted towns and villages, causing material damage and affecting civilians, particularly at the start of the expedition in April–May 1915. The highest number of allied attacks on non-military objects and sites relate, however, to medical facilities. Those strikes were denounced with the utmost vigour by the Ottoman authorities and by the Red Crescent. Although the Allies expressed their regret, for example in the case of the bombing of a hospital in Akbas in May 1915, promised to respect the Geneva Convention of 1906,⁴⁴ and

40 For the following paragraph, see *Harp Tarihi Gezileri II (Çanakkale – Gelibolu)*, Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 2010, pp. 90–92.

41 Alongside other older military cemeteries, the martyrium (*şehitlik*) on the hilltops, was built in 1945 and restored between 1999 and 2013; it contains, in particular, the symbolic burial places of wounded people who were killed in those bombings and torpedoings.

42 Suleyman Pasha (1316–1359) was the son of Sultan Orhan. He is remembered for the major role that he played in the Ottoman conquests of the Balkans.

43 For a facsimile of the telegram, see M. Albayrak, Vol. I, above note 14, pp. 70–71.

44 See the correspondence forwarded at the end of October 1915 via the United States embassy in Constantinople and referring to the July 1915 bombing of the hospital at Halil Pasha farm.

even admitted that they had hit civilian objects,⁴⁵ they often presented a series of extenuating circumstances. The arguments focused on the accidental nature of the strikes but also criticized the Ottomans for placing their hospitals too close to frontlines or to military buildings, and even suggested that the hospitals might contain military stores. They also pointed out that medical services were not always clearly marked as such and that their aircraft flew too high to be able to pick out mobile hospitals.

The identification of medical services was an issue that was at the core of the arguments put forward by the Ottomans, who insisted that the Red Crescent emblem was clearly visible on the ground and on the flags flown from masts and protested, as did the Allies, against the misuse of medical services for military purposes. Great Britain was accused of having used a Red Cross vehicle in late June/early July 1915 to reconnoitre the tip of the peninsula between Sedd el Bahr and Tekke Burnu,⁴⁶ and of having concealed a warship behind a hospital ship. Those accusations were taken up by their German ally, whose government published a memorandum on 29 January 1917 on the abuse of hospital ships by Great Britain in violation of the Geneva and the Hague Conventions. The *Bulletin International des sociétés de la Croix-Rouge*, which later became the *International Review of the Red Cross*, then reported on that memorandum, stating that Germany was accusing its enemy of using hospital ships for military purposes and primarily to transport troops. In sum, non-military objects were struck by both belligerents, which admitted their deeds, but provided justifications and/or extenuating circumstances.⁴⁷

The treatment of prisoners of war: A recently revived post-war controversy

The Ottoman Empire's international legal obligations with regard to the treatment of prisoners were primarily defined by the Hague Convention of 1899,⁴⁸ which the *Sublime Porte* ratified on 12 June 1907,⁴⁹ and the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 6 July 1906.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, numerous violations of respective rules on the treatment of prisoners of war have been documented. These instruments themselves did not

45 These kinds of statements were made in the cases of the bombardment of Lapseki (through the British Red Cross), Gallipoli (through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for France) or Maydos (through the military authorities).

46 The ambulance was said to have stopped for some 15 minutes at each strategic position.

47 See *Bulletin International des sociétés de la Croix-Rouge*, Vol. 48, No. 190, 1917, pp. 186–188.

48 Other belligerent powers were parties to other international conventions.

49 *Düstur*, (1. Tertip), Vol. VII, 1941, pp. 307–301. It is interesting to note that the text was published in this collection of Turkish laws in the Republican era (and right in the middle of the Second World War), which confirms once again the legal continuity between the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. See Emre Öktem, "Turkey: Successor or Continuing State of the Ottoman Empire?" *Leiden Journal of International Law*, Vol. 24, 2011, pp. 561–583.

50 Ratified on 24 August 1907. See ICRC, "Turkey- Historical documents", *Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries*, available at: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/dih.nsf/vwTreatiesHistoricalByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=TR.

envisage the system of repressions in case of non-compliance. According to a report presented to the British Attorney General in January 1919:

... The Hague Conventions nowhere prescribe punishment for breaches of the laws of war. But the well-known usages as to punishment are not abrogated; and they are implied in the Regulations annexed to Convention II of 1899 and Convention IV of 1907. As late as 1880, the Institute of International Law accepted the principle that a belligerent is entitled to punish by such laws as he prescribes violations of the laws of war.⁵¹

With regard to the questioning of prisoners, Article 9 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land appended to the Convention (IV) of 18 October 1907 is of particular relevance stating that: “Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, and if he infringes this rule, he is liable to a curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war of his class.”⁵² There have also been reported cases of compliance with the Hague Convention. For instance, Luscombe, an Australian who was taken captive in August 1915, was interrogated by General Liman von Sanders himself “in accordance with the Hague Convention”.⁵³

The treatment of prisoners of war during WWI, and particularly during the Battle of the Dardanelles, is a matter that has been taken up regularly in Turkey since the early 2000s.⁵⁴ However, to say that is being “debated” today it is not entirely accurate because the Turkish studies, which are based on various archives but also at times on prisoners’ accounts, all follow the same line of thought and emphasize two symmetrical dimensions. Firstly, they begin by defending the idea that foreign prisoners in Anatolian territory were well treated,⁵⁵ like “guests of the Sultan”, as Yücel Yanıkdağ⁵⁶ puts it, using an expression initially employed in the training manual for Ottoman soldiers. As for the sources that represent recollections by prisoners in Ottoman hands, who were very negative about the treatment they received, the historian Yücel Yanıkdağ reports that they are today reviewed critically in some studies by European historians.⁵⁷ Secondly, some

51 *Interim Reports from the Committee of Inquiry into Breaches of the Laws of War*, report presented to the Attorney General on 13 January 1919, Art. 24; quoted in Doğan Şahin, *Türklere Esir Olmak – Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Savaş Yıllarında Yabancı Esirler*, Ozan Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2015, p. 89.

52 Similar provision is made in Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC III), Art. 17(1) and (2).

53 L.H. Luscombe, *The Story of Herold Earl – Australian*, W.R. Smith & Paterson, Brisbane, 1970, quoted in D. Şahin, above note 51, p. 121.

54 See the foundational work by Cemalettin Taşkıran, *Ana Ben Ölmedim – I. Dünya Savaşında Türk Esirleri*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001.

55 See, in particular, the most recent study by Doğan Şahin, above note 51.

56 Yücel Yanıkdağ, “Prisoners of War (Ottoman Empire/Middle East)”, 1914–1918 Online. *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer and Bill Nasson, (eds), Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15463/ie1418.10269>.

57 Y. Yanıkdağ, above note 56.

emphasize that, conversely, “Turkish” prisoners were not well treated by the Allies, particularly in Sidi Bashir camp near Alexandria, in Egypt.⁵⁸

First of all, it may be noted that the death rate among prisoners on the Ottoman fronts was higher than among prisoners of war (POWs) on the Western one. It should also be pointed out that it is difficult to draw up an exhaustive map of the camps and to systematically count the prisoners, and that it is not easy to single out the prisoners from the Gallipoli Peninsula because they were often held with prisoners from other areas.

The camps for Ottoman prisoners in Egypt, or even in eastern Asia (e.g. India and Burma), which included combatants from the Dardanelles, were also considered worse;⁵⁹ the natural conditions, especially the climate, and, where relevant, the distance from the Ottoman Empire, played a role in some of those views.

The Afyon camp was chosen because of its location at the railway crossing; it was used as a distribution camp for other camps, including the camps in Kayseri, Ankara, Çankırı. In 1916 a second camp was set up there for British prisoners. Official British reports about the camp were issued in November 1918, at the start of the British occupation of Istanbul. They criticized the lack of visits and especially the management of the camps, which did not give prisoners any opportunity to voice complaints.⁶⁰ The *Report on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Turkey* released in the autumn of 1918 and produced by a government committee headed by Lord Justice Younger, describes the camp as follows:

Some of the prisoners from the Dardanelles were here early in 1916. ... The British were lodged in an old Armenian church with its outbuildings – cold and dirty quarters. ... And... suffered severely under a barbarous discipline... Fortunately, [camp commander Major Mazlum Bey’s] behaviour became notorious, and the Turkish Government, under pressure, removed him early in 1917... The dead were buried by their comrades in the Christian cemetery of the town. ... Yet all communication between officers and men was flatly forbidden ... English doctors had thus to wait inactive, knowing that the men were dying almost daily... All this was afterwards happily changed⁶¹ since then and Afion became a good camp; the men there ... enjoy considerable freedom and have plenty of occupation and amusement...the embargo on communication with the officers has been removed, so that sickness can be properly treated... on Christmas Day, there being no firewood and twenty degrees of frost, the officers took their dinner in bed... They had books and

58 Ahmet Altunay, *Katran kazanında sterilize. Bir Türk subayının İngiliz esir kampında üç yıl*, Tarih Düşünce Kitapları, İstanbul, 2004; see also Cemil Yurşev, *Gözlerim Eyvah!*, Çukurovalı yay, Adana, 2009.

59 See C. Taşkıran, above note 54, pp. 58–115.

60 See *Report on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Turkey*, presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, November 1918, published by His Majesty’s Stationery Office, UK, 1918, pp. 2–3.

61 This change came about after Mazlum Bey was transferred.

games indoors, fixed hours of study, and a flourishing run of amateur theatricals.⁶²

During the construction of a stretch of the Berlin–Baghdad railway 70 kilometres from Adana, a veritable German village was established in 1907 in the Bilemedik region, not far from Pozanti. It had a population of 35,000 and contained a modern hospital, a church, a mosque, a cinema and a brothel.⁶³ The *Report on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Turkey* paints a less idyllic picture of the war period:

Bilemedik was in a deep valley, under towering mountains, a bad place for malaria... On Sundays the men could go and picnic by the river, play cricket and bathe... (All camps) were under the same rule – that of the civilian chief engineer, usually a German or Austrian; there would be a few Turkish sentries, supposed to guard the prisoners, but no real military organisation. It is probable that there was very little active ill-treatment ...⁶⁴

The ICRC fulfilled its duty by sending delegations to inspect the camps whose administration was a matter of controversy between the belligerents. The ICRC inspected the British camps in Egypt, India and Burma and the French camps in France to determine whether prisoners were treated in conformity with international law. It also visited the Ottoman camps in Anatolia. Despite the Ottoman government's unfavourable view of the Red Crescent intervention on behalf of POWs, the Red Crescent set up a "Prisoners' Commission". The ICRC started to ask for lists of prisoners, highlighting the ineffectiveness of government policy in that field. The Red Crescent provided lists of French and British prisoners in April 1915, which made it possible to start negotiations with a view to obtaining lists of Turkish prisoners.⁶⁵ Two ICRC delegates visited the camps in Turkey in October 1916 and January 1917 to determine whether the prisoners were being treated in conformity with international law. It was reported that prisoners were made to sign statements in which they undertook not to try to escape,⁶⁶ which seems to indicate that attempted escapes were a problem.⁶⁷

When the sources on the treatment of prisoners related to the exposure of POWs to public curiosity are compared, a mixed picture appears. There are several references to the Ottomans exhibiting prisoners before the local people. In his memoirs, Lushington relates how he was paraded through the streets of Istanbul,

62 *Report on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Turkey*, above note 60, pp. 11–12, 15.

63 *Ibid.*, pp. 175–176. The remains of the German cemetery have been transferred but its location is marked by a monument that was inaugurated in 2005.

64 *Report on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Turkey*, above note 60, p. 13.

65 *Ibid.*, pp. 175–176.

66 A. Altunay, above note 56, p. 182.

67 Compare with the article 8 of the 1899 Hague Regulations stipulates that "Escaped prisoners who are retaken before succeeding in escaping from the enemy's actual sphere of action, or before being able to rejoin the armed force to which they belong, are liable to disciplinary punishment. Prisoners who, after succeeding in escaping, are again taken prisoners, are not liable to any punishment on account of the previous flight". Similar provisions were later adopted in the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929 (not in force), Art. 50 and in GC III, Arts 91–92.

where the crowd looked at him with curiosity but without hostility.⁶⁸ The Australian national Daniel Creedon pointed out that the cart transporting prisoners made frequent stops to allow the people to gaze at the English, a real curiosity.⁶⁹ Lastly, Randall reported that Turkish women insulted the prisoners.⁷⁰

The work carried out by Ottoman prisoners, a widespread practice in the French camps, was presented favourably in the ICRC report. However, it could also be considered forced labour or, for example in Belemelik and on Cyprus, where Ottoman prisoners were made to work in the port of Famagusta, loading ships carrying logistics material to the British army in Suez.⁷¹ In Afyon, officers called for greater freedom to move around the market and the right to make purchases there.⁷²

As per mutilations, the most infamous – and most controversial – incident was the alleged blinding of POWs by British or Armenian doctors in the Sidi Bashir camp in Egypt. A resolution of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey of 28 June 1921 (i.e. in the midst of the war of independence), signed by Mustafa Kemal and eleven ministers, called for legal action to be taken against the garrison commander, the officers and the doctors who allegedly deliberately blinded approximately fifteen thousand prisoners in the prison camps in Egypt.⁷³ In addition, in May 1919 Ali Nadir Pasha, the commander of an army corps in Izmir, reported to the high command that 303 of the soldiers in the fourth group repatriated from Egypt were blind. A circular sent by the high command to the army corps that same month confirmed this. The Ottoman press in both Istanbul and Anatolia made these allegations public. Notably, in post-war occupied Istanbul, British General Milne gave orders to stop the publication of the daily newspaper *Öğüt*, which was publishing regular information about the soldiers who had been blinded, and had it closed down. Mustafa Kemal then sent a telegram to the regional government in Konya inviting the townspeople to organize a meeting to protest the violation of freedom of the press. A demonstration by five thousand people took place on 23 January 1920.⁷⁴

68 R. F. Lushington, *A Prisoner with the Turks, 1915–1918*, Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. Ltd, London, 1923, in D. Şahin, above note 51, pp. 121–122.

69 D. Şahin, above note 51, pp. 139–140.

70 Randall Family Papers, State Library of Victoria, MSB 401, MS 11287, in D. Şahin, above note 51, pp. 122–123.

71 Cemalettin Taşkıran, *Ana Ben Ölmedim – I. Dünya Savaşında Türk Esirleri*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, pp. 149, 156 and 159.

72 Osman Akandere and Hasan Ali Polat, “Esirler Perspektifinden Çanakkale Muharebelerinin Dramatik Yüzü”, *Gelibolu, Efsane ve Anı*, İstanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi, 2013, pp. 190–192.

73 That resolution was likely the outcome of a motion tabled by two members of parliament from Edirne, Faik Bey and Şeref Bey, on 28 May 1921 regarding the repatriation of Turkish prisoners to Malta, the last part of which asks for “the doctors, the officers and the British commander who, with malice aforethought and under the pretext of medical sterilization, methodically plunged 15,000 children of the homeland into a bath containing too much cresol be pronounced criminals”. Having taken the floor, Şeref Bey then explained to the Assembly that “Turkish” prisoners were first plunged in this bath up to their necks; British soldiers then forced them to immerse themselves fully by threatening them with bayonets; that was how 15,000 “Turks” allegedly lost their sight. A. Altınay, above note 56, p. 15.

74 C. Taşkıran, above note 72, pp. 143–144. Notably, Mustafa Kemal then sent a telegram to the regional government in Konya inviting the townspeople to organize a meeting to protest about violation of freedom of the press: a demonstration by five thousand people took place on 23 January 1920.

It was also alleged that Armenian doctors working in the prison camps in Egypt took advantage of eye diseases to carry out surgery with the intention of blinding “Turkish” patients.⁷⁵ The ICRC’s report on its visit to the camps in Egypt shows that 20% of the prisoners in the camp in Heliopolis had conjunctivitis, which had been caused by the long period that they had spent in the desert before they were taken captive; they were treated with zinc sulphate and protargol. In addition, four prisoners had long-standing trachoma.⁷⁶ There were also allegations of insults against “Turkish” officers at the Sidi Bashir camp. Ahmet Altınay cites reports that Armenian interpreters systematically asked new arrivals “How many Armenians have you killed?” during registration.⁷⁷

According to the Turkish historian Taşkıran, hundreds of prisoners came home blind from Egypt.⁷⁸ It is impossible to prove the allegations of those prisoners being deliberately blinded by chemical treatment or surgical interventions. The official reports, as well as the recollections of repatriated prisoners, emphasize the fact that the British treated their prisoners well and gave them good medical care. According to Taşkıran, it nonetheless cannot be ruled out that some prisoners lost their sight because of medical errors nor that, in a spirit of revenge, Armenian doctors subjected some patients to treatment that the doctors may have deliberately deprived them of their sight.⁷⁹ This case displays a clear controversy, and there is no clear and convincing evidence to substantiate either side.

Conclusion

An analyses of the practices used by the parties to the conflict during the battle of Dardanelles shows that violations of the rules of war was of concern to many political and military actors. Those actors came from the parties to the conflict but also from elsewhere, for example from embassies of neutral countries and, of course, the ICRC. Despite their limitations, the two reports that the ICRC published on its visits to prison camps are extremely valuable. This also shows that systematic use of the ICRC archives enable current knowledge to be supplemented.

The statements regarding the violations of the laws of war and the call for the parties to the conflict to comply therewith, made at the time by third parties or

75 It was alleged that two Armenian doctors carried out surgery in the Sidi Bashir camp under the auspices of physician Colonel E.G. Garner. C. Taşkıran, above note 72, pp. 143–144.

76 ICRC, Report on visits to camps in Egypt, p. 45. See also ICRC, *Turkish Prisoners in Egypt. A Report by the International Committee of the Red Cross*, London, 1917, pp. 9–10.

77 A. Altınay, above note 58, p. 15.

78 Yücel Yanıkdağ (2014). The historian Yücel Yanıkdağ draws attention to the fact that illnesses killed or disabled many prisoners in the British camps in Egypt: trachoma, an infectious and contagious eye disease, and pellagra, an illness caused by malnutrition, which is said to have affected 9300 Ottoman prisoners. He points out that pellagra develops primarily because of ill treatment or insufficient supply of B3 vitamins, resulting from differences in the European and non-European diet. Y. Yanıkdağ, above note 56.

79 ICRC, above note 78, p. 45. See also *Turkish Prisoners in Egypt. A Report by the International Committee of the Red Cross*, above note 78, pp. 145–147.

actors like the ICRC, ran the risk of being instrumentalized by the adversaries. In fact, alleged violations of the rules of war were manipulated by the States involved at the highest level.⁸⁰ That manipulation paradoxically is evidence to the fact that the law was taken into account, even if it was distorted. The propaganda that stemmed from that instrumentalization was aimed at neutral countries and international public opinion, which were called to bear witness. It is also an internal propaganda tool that operated through the press.

The list of violations of the law is ultimately very mixed. Understandably, that does not relate solely to the obvious differences between the four types of violation reviewed in this article. Many other variables need to be included. The study of prisoners' treatment shows that officers were given preferential treatment as they were not assigned to the same type of accommodation as ordinary soldiers. There was also disparate treatment of people from the Empires from different ethnic groups. However, there does not seem to have been discrimination based on religion.

Time and space were also key factors. A finely tuned chronology is needed to take account of the variations that occurred over time as well as the interaction with other fronts. As shown by the above discussion of the use of gas warfare, predicting enemy conduct was also an important factor. It is appropriate to delve as far as possible into the local level to gain a better understanding of the extent to which the natural environment and the proximity of the two armies may have played a role, as well as the extent of differences between camps.

The principle of reciprocity, which entails reprisals by the enemy and is referred to many times in this article, appears to be a key factor in the analysis and in the conduct of the belligerents.⁸¹ Its position points to another – legal – reality with regards to international law. In that respect, the Ottoman Empire is considered to be an actor on a par with the others. Paradoxically, it was during the war that led to its final collapse and its dissolution that the Ottoman Empire, which was recognized in the Treaty of Paris of 1856 as a power permitted to

80 See for example the personal involvement of Enver Pasha through his correspondence appealing to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed above.

81 Needless to say that nowadays, the principle of reciprocity is extraneous to IHL and reprisals used to the detriment of persons protected by IHL are prohibited. The rejection of reciprocity in IHL progressively pervaded international human rights law. See René Provost, "Reciprocity in human rights and humanitarian law", *British Year Book of International Law*, 1994, pp. 383 ff; Maria Felicita Gennarelli, "Le riserve ai trattati sui diritti umani", *Rivista della cooperazione giuridica internazionale*, Vol. IV, No. 11, 2002, p. 40; Gérard Cohen-Jonathan, "Les réserves dans les traités institutionnels relatifs aux droits de l'homme. Nouveaux aspects européens et internationaux", in *Revue générale de droit international public*, Vol. 4, 1996, p. 916 ; Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, "The Treaty on Treaties", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 64, No. 3, 1970, p. 540; Francesco Caportorti, "L'extinction et la suspension des traités", *Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International*, Vol. 134, No. 3, 1971, p. 554; Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), art. 50§1c; France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands v. Turkey, 6 December 1983 (admissibility), European Commission on Human Rights, Decisions and reports, 35, p. 196, §39.

“participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe”,⁸² finally became a full participant in the interplay between the European powers, regardless of whether those powers were fighting against it or were its allies.

The aforementioned principle of reciprocity is a complex phenomenon that would be worth studying in its own right. Well absorbed by the actors on the battlefield, it often seems to have been a factor that has dissuaded States from infringing the law. However, reciprocity may also lead to a chain of violence stemming from reprisals, which is sometimes a threat that is held high. There is lastly a human element, which is not predictable and cannot be predicted by senior command officers. That explains erroneous perceptions during warfare (see the above discussion of dum-dum bullets), but can also attenuate conditions in which prisoners are held.

The final aspect to which we would like to refer here is that of history. The passage of time diminishes the power of personal accounts in different contexts, although it also causes long-forgotten issues to re-emerge not only as matters of remembrance but also – and importantly – as political factors when history is juxtaposed with new realities. The writer Jean Giraudoux, a veteran of the Dardanelles who became a fervent pacifist after the Great War, titled his 1935 play *La guerre de Troie n'aura pas lieu* (The Trojan War will not take place). In the tumult of the years preceding a new, seemingly imminent conflict, he used peacetime to express strong criticism of the political manipulations of the law. The study of violations of the rules of war relating to the battle of the Dardanelles shows that the rules were taken seriously, even if the law of war was instrumentalized by the belligerents. It also shows that the matter of alleged violations does not disappear once the war is over and that it continues to point to persistent or recurrent tensions.

82 See Emre Öktem, “Le traité de Paris de 1856 revisité à son 150ème anniversaire: quelques aspects juridiques internationaux”, *Le congrès de Paris (1856) un événement fondateur*, Gilbert Ameil, Isabelle Nathan and Georges Soutou (eds), Directorate of Archives, French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2009, pp. 151–170.