
The Hague Convention was constantly considered by all belligerents throughout the Second World War and substantially during the First World War as compulsory and as the expression of the recognized principles of the law of war. Consequently, its scope goes far beyond that of a mere treaty or agreement between the Parties which signed it with liberty for any of them to withdraw from it at any time. For that reason, it is not necessary to examine whether the belligerent whose behaviour is attacked as a breach of the Convention has justification or not to contest the authority of the Convention on the ground that it has never been a Party thereto or, if it has been, that it denounces it. The Convention is compulsory as a rule of common law or as a rule valid for all members of the community of nations.

The same remarks are equally valid for the 1949 Conventions . . .


The present crisis in education, in so far as it is positive, or in so far as it is due more to our understanding of the problems and our determination to solve them than to our mistakes or our short-comings, presents, however, one feature which is quite without precedent. For the first time in history it is now possible—indeed, it seems to be increasingly necessary—to apprehend the problem of education and try to solve it for humanity as a whole. It is the quantitative universality of the problem we are investigating and the qualitative universality of our thinking concerning it, that account for the complexity and difficulty of the task on which we are engaged, but also for its exceptional importance.